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The primary course blog for HIST 246, Spring 2011
 

Archive for the ‘Slavery’ Category

Building Fort Griffin

Wednesday, March 9th, 2011

Yesterday in class, I mentioned that Confederate engineers used 500 slaves to build Fort Griffin–the fortification that proved crucial to Dowling’s victory in the Battle of Sabine Pass. In his book, Sabine Pass, which is still available on Fondren reserve, historian Edward Cotham has this to say about the conditions in which these slaves worked:

Expense records that have survived suggest that most of these slaves were transported from the Houston and Galveston areas to work on this project. This must have been extremely difficult and dangerous work. The records that have survived for similar projects in Galveston reflect a large number of fatalities among the slaves who were brought in and forced to build those fortifications. …

Kellersberg was concerned that the slaves’ owners would not make them available for work if they were abused. As he admitted in one letter requesting additional cornmeal rations in 1861, “They work hard & if such bad policy [underfeeding the slaves] is pursued, we won’t get any more of them.” The fact that the work was difficult, combined with the fact that at times relatively few slaves were available, meant that construction of the new fort at Sabine Pass tended to progress slowly, sometimes crawling to a complete stop. At one point in July, work had been suspended for so long that a local rumor suggested that the plan to build a new fort had been abandoned entirely, to be replaced with a scheme that called for Sabine Pass to be defended by cottonclad steamers alone. …

Most of the important work constructing Fort Griffin seems to have been done in the heat and humidity of August. Nicholas H. Smith, an engineer from Louisiana who had drawn the terrible assignment of supervising on-site all of the finishing touches on the fort, headed his letters from Fort Griffin with the designation “Headquarters of the Army of Mosquitoes,” noting that these insects “are so bad here that it is almost impossible for man or horse to live.” Under these conditions, the tasks of driving pilings, building a palisade, and mounting the remaining guns were proving difficult, if not impossible. Smith’s job was made even harder because of the absence of materials and the scarcity of manpower in what he described as this most “accursed of all places.” Lamenting that Colonel Sulakowski was now forcing him to work approximately eighteen hours out of each twenty-four, Smith summarized his views succinctly: “This place is hell.” Appealing to his supervisor and an even higher authority, Smith wrote near the end of August that “I wish to God you would relieve me of this place.”

(Source: Edward T. Cotham, Jr., Sabine Pass: The Confederacy’s Thermopylae (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 78-79)

Some questions prompted by this passage: How does the fact that Fort Griffin was built by the forced labor of slaves affect the way you view Dowling and the memory of the battle of Sabine Pass? Should their numbers be included in the numbers of men that Dowling and the Confederates had at their disposal to prepare for the battle? Why do you think that Jefferson Davis and other Dowling promoters did not talk much about the fort itself or the conditions in which it was built? And how should the fort and the battle be remembered today? The official historic park at Sabine Pass mentions briefly the involvement of slaves in construction, but if you were to go to the actual site and see the huge statue of Dowling, what conclusions would you come away with? Is the site–either there or online–organized in such a way to ensure that the role of slavery in the battle and the war is remembered?

Why did Texas secede?

Tuesday, March 1st, 2011

Texas Ordinance of Secession, 1861

We interrupt this Spring Break to note that on this day, 150 years ago, Texas officially became a Confederate state. That makes this as good a time as any to reflect on the question: Why did Texas secede?

First, it is worth noting that secession had been brewing for months before March 1, 1861, when the final deed was struck. As today’s post on the New York Times “Disunion” blog notes, Unionists in Texas were an embattled group that did not put up much of a fight to keep Texas in the Union. On February 16, 1861, U.S. General David Twiggs and all the federal troops under his command quickly surrendered under pressure from hundreds of armed secessionists who surrounded him in San Antonio. Two days later, without a shot being fired, he and his troops filed out of Texas, leaving it to the Confederacy. Only two weeks before Twiggs’ surrender, a secession convention in Austin had adopted two documents: an ordinance of secession from the Union (pictured above), and a declaration of the state’s causes for secession. And only two weeks after Twiggs’ surrender, the deed was officially done.

If you had happened to be in San Antonio two weeks ago, you might have seen a reenactment of Twiggs’ surrender. As a recent article in the Texas Observer reported, this reenactment–organized partly by the Sons of Confederate Veterans–takes place every year on the plaza of the Alamo. But as the article also notes, if you had asked the reenactment’s organizers about the reasons for Texas’s secession, you probably wouldn’t have heard much about slavery. One of the past organizers interviewed by the Observer even said bluntly that “the South was fighting for states’ rights,” not about slavery per se.

In fact, however, the Declaration of the Causes which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union, adopted by the secession convention in Austin on February 2, 1861, returns again and again to the issues of slavery and race. First, the declaration argues that Texas only agreed to join the Union in 1845 on the understanding that “the institution known as negro slavery–the servitude of the African to the white race within her limits” would be protected and allowed to “exist in all future time.” According to the secessionists who voted Texas out of the Union, the federal government was now advancing schemes that would lead to the “ruin of the slave-holding States.” As a result, said the secessionists, Texans wanted to make their own views clear:

We hold as undeniable truths that the governments of the various States, and of the confederacy itself, were established exclusively by the white race, for themselves and their posterity; that the African race had no agency in their establishment; that they were rightfully held and regarded as an inferior and dependent race, and in that condition only could their existence in this country be rendered beneficial or tolerable.

That in this free government all white men are and of right ought to be entitled to equal civil and political rights; that the servitude of the African race, as existing in these States, is mutually beneficial to both bond and free, and is abundantly authorized and justified by the experience of mankind, and the revealed will of the Almighty Creator, as recognized by all Christian nations; while the destruction of the existing relations between the two races, as advocated by our sectional enemies, would bring inevitable calamities upon both and desolation upon the fifteen slave-holding States.

In short, secessionists in Texas made clear, in their own words, that they were seceding to preserve the institution of slavery permanently and to maintain a government for whites only.

One question worth pondering in the coming weeks: if this is what Texan secessionists went on record to say when they left the Union, what did Dick Dowling think about secession? In last week’s blog post, Ross raises the question of what Dowling was fighting for at Sabine Pass. How would you answer that question? Have you found evidence in your research that might indicate where Dowling stood?

At the very least, we know that Dowling was a fervent supporter of secession from very early on. He was one of over two hundred people who signed a petition in November 1860, immediately after Lincoln’s election, calling for a public meeting in Houston that later voted to ask the governor to convene the legislature. When Governor Sam Houston, a Unionist, refused to do that, secessionists took matters into the own hands by planning the February 1861 secession convention. Dowling’s rapidly enlisted after that convention called for troops, and while he was not present at Twiggs’ surrender, he was part of a group of militia companies dispatched to the lower Rio Grande Valley to force a federal army post there to surrender, which it did not long after Twiggs folded.

All of this happened before shots had been fired on Fort Sumter. There was no immediate threat of federal armies marching on Texas; on the contrary, the few federal troops in Texas were marching out. But in this crucial month, it was clear that Dowling stood on the side of the secessionists. That raises several questions worth thinking about as we continue to talk about Dowling: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, is it safe to assume he agreed with the “causes” for secession outlined in the convention’s declaration? Is there evidence that other motives played a role in his thinking? When Texas secessionists spoke about political equality for all white men, would they have included Irish Catholics like Dowling?

And here’s another question: regardless of what Dowling personally thought, what do Texas’ secession documents tell us about the kind of society Texas would have been if his side had succeeded? If Dowling’s victory at Sabine Pass had not been an isolated victory, but instead had succeeded in keeping Texas permanently outside the Union, what would Texas have looked like? If it would have looked at all like the society of permanent slavery and white supremacy envisioned in the Declaration, is it even possible to consider Dowling a hero?

Feel free to post comments on this post if you’d like to weigh in on these questions. I have been enjoying working through your Library Assignment posts. As Mercy notes in her latest round-up, your classmates have written some great posts that you should read. In the meantime, have a great Spring Break, and I’ll see you in a week.

More on Manning

Monday, January 31st, 2011

Thanks to all of you for your thoughtful discussion of the Manning book on Thursday during class, as well as on your group blogs. Mercy has a good round-up highlighting some of the points made in that discussion; check it out if you haven’t already.

One of the points that came up both in class and on the blogs, and which seemed to underlie some skepticism about Manning’s argument, is the point that Northern soldiers seemed to express as much racial prejudice–particularly at the start of the War–as their Southern counterparts. Yet Manning seems to emphasize the motivating power of those prejudices more in the case of the Confederates fighting to defend slavery than in the case of the Union soldiers fighting to abolish it. Why?

An important point to remember here is an distinction that Manning makes throughout the book between support for emancipation and support for racial equality. As she shows time and again, it was possible for Union soldiers to come to support emancipation without believing in racial egalitarianism. As she puts it, in the Union ranks, “antagonism toward slavery rarely meant support for equal rights for African Americans” (p. 79). Yet this didn’t necessarily diminish Union soldiers’ hostility toward slavery, because they “sought to separate the issue of slavery from the more complicated questions of black rights and racial equality” (pp. 79-80). According to Manning, the difference between most Union and Confederate soldiers was that Confederates could not conceive of such a separation, whereas Union soldiers could. While there was a “small number” of nonslaveholding Confederate soldiers who started to voice antagonism towards slavery, particularly in late 1863 when Confederates’ disillusionment with their government swelled, those doubts never seriously undermined Confederate soldiers’ “commitment to slavery” (see pp. 138-141). The primary reason, according to Manning, is their inability to separate the abolition of slavery from the abolition of racial hierarchy. Union soldiers, on the other hand, often kept those issues separate.

This is an important point to remember, especially because in retrospect it may seem hard to grasp how someone could fervently desire the abolition of slavery and just as fervently oppose racial egalitarianism. Yet this was a viable and quite prevalent position throughout the Civil War North. As a result, pointing out the presence of racism in both the North and the South does not by itself undermine Manning’s evidence that many Union soldiers came to support emancipation, nor does it prove that Confederates, simply by holding some of the same racial views as their Northern counterparts, must have had the same point of view about slavery as well.

Shifting gears for a moment, it’s also important to think about why slaveholders in the Confederacy fought, even though the prompts for Blog Post #3 asked you to focus on the question of non-slaveholders’ motivations. The question of slaveholders’ thinking about the coming of the War is addressed in an interesting recent post by historian Louis Masur on the New York Times blog, “Disunion.” I’d encourage you to take a look at Masur’s close analysis of “A Slaveholder’s Diary,” and I also recommend the “Disunion” blog more generally. The Times has commissioned a great group of writers who are publishing regular posts on the war throughout the year to mark the sesquicentennial of the war.

The Washington Post has a similar blog called House Divided, and on this blog, Manning–a professor at Georgetown University–is actually a regular contributor.

Bookmark these two blogs or add them to your RSS readers, and you’ll be sure to have some interesting reading material that can complement our course readings and even provide you with evidence to use for your blog posts!